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The Animal Law Committee is the newest committee of the Tort Trial & 
Insurance Practice Section. Although the scope of the Animal Law Com-
mittee will somewhat overlap with existing committees in TIPS, orte of the 
goals of the Animal Law Conunittee is to consolidate and focus on issues 
that involve animal law components in order to assist attorneys who either 
concentrate their practice on animal law issues or periodically deal with 
these issues. 
Rebecca J. Huss is a Proftssor of Law at Valparaiso University School of Law in Val-
paraiso, Indiana. 
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This article focuses on recent developments in litigation and legislation 
involving the injury or death of animals.• In future years the committee, 
which has a broad mandate in animal law subjects, will provide a more 
global picture of the developments in tort issues involving animals. For 
example., an area of tort law with significant activity is liability relating to 
injuries caused by animals.2 Transactional tort topics involving. animals in-
clude issues such as insurance coverage for households that contain partic-
ular breeds of dogs or other types of animals~3 
This article will first discuss recent veterinary malpractice cases where 
the central issue was not related to damages. Next, the article will analyze 
recent cases that have focused on the appropriate way to value animals that 
have been injured or killed due to the tortious acts of another. Finally, this. 
article will highlight recent legislative efforts that allow for civil suits based 
on the injury or death of an animal. 
II. VETERINARY MALPRACTICE ISSUES 
Veterinary malpractice cases are similar in many ways to medical malprac-
tice lawsuits. Recent cases can be divided into procedural and evidentiary 
• Issues. 
A. Procedural Issues 
Some of the most advanced veterinary care is perforrned by state veterinary 
teaching hospitals associated with colleges of veterinary medicine. Claims 
. 
l. In order to provide some needed background on these cases, some useful older cases 
will be referenced in the foomotes. Please note that, since this is an emerging area of the law, 
unpublished decisions and lower court decisions will be discussed. Although many of the 
decisions may not have precedential value, they are useful as a guide to the way courts are 
approaching these issues. 
2. This includes cases involving attacks by animals as well as cases relating to fencing issues 
or livestock on roadways. See; e.g., Galloway v. Kuhl, 806 N.E.2d 251 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) 
(analyzing issues in case where cattle had strayed onto a highway); Andrus v. L.A.D. Corp., 
875 So. 2d 124 (La. Ct .. ,App. 2004) (discussing liability in dog attack); McCoy v. Lucius, 839 
So. 2d 1050 (La. Ct. App. 2003) (reversing a grant of damages for injuries caused by a dog 
attacking another dog, because the attacking dog had been provoked); Savory v. Hensick, 14 3 
S.W.3d 712 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004) (affirming jury verdict against homeowner for damages 
incurred when a contractor stepped on homeowner's dog and fell); Buetmer v. Beasley, No., 
83271,2004 WL 813515 (OhioCt.App.Apr.15, 2004)(discussing0hiostrictliabilitystatute 
relating to dog bites); Rothenbusch-Rhodes v. Mason, No. 02AP-1028, 2003 WL 22056565 
(Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 4, 2003) (affirming judgment of lower coun and discussing variety of 
damages available in dog bite case); Jackson v. Mateus, 70 P.3d 78 (Utah 2003) (discussing 
liability relating to a cat bite); Fandrey v. Amer. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., 680 N.W2d 345 (Wis. 
2004) (allowing for courts to preclude liability under the Wisconsin dog bite statute based on 
public policy factors); Borns v~ Voss, 70 P.3d 262 (Wyo. 2003) (considering Wyoming's dog 
bite law and reversing award of su.nunary judgment). 
3. In Michigan, for example, the state agency regulating insurance has stated that home-
owners insurance companies can no longer deny, cancel, or refuse to renew a policy solely on 
the basis of what type of dog a homeowner owns. See Michigan Office., of Ins. & .Fin. Servs., 
Specific Breed of Dog Exclusions, Bulletin No. 2003-07-INS (Sept. 3, 2003, updated Feb. 11, 
2004), llVailabJe at\vww.michigan.gov/cis/0,1607,7-154-10555_12900_13376-86214--,00.html. 
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against these entities may be limited by state tort claims acts. Jovanovic v. 
Iowa State University veterinary Teaching Hospital College of Veterinary Med-
icine: Equine Section 4 provides a recent example. Jovanovic's horse died 
while being treated at the veterinary hospitaL Although Jovanovic argued 
that his complaint referred to the negligence of veterinary hospital em-
• 
ployees as well as the entity, the trial court dismissed the claim, citing to 
the Iowa Tort Claims Act5 provision that specifies that claims against state 
agencies are not authorized.6 
Deternlining the appropriate statute of limitations for a veterinary mal-
practice action was at issue in a few recent cases .. Some states have specific 
statutory provisions designating the relevant statute of limitations. In other 
states there has been confusion over the applicable statute of limitations 
and the interpretation of such restriction. In the New York case of Ratusch 
v. Attas,7 the court was asked to determine whether a one-year discovery 
rule pertaining to "foreign objects" left inside a patient would apply to a 
veterinary malpractice action. 8 The veterinarian allegedly left a gauze sponge 
inside a dog during a spaying procedure in 1997. In 2003, the sponge was 
discovered by a different veterinarian during another procedure. Without 
the application of the one-year discovery rule, the plaintiff's claim would 
be time barred. The Ratusch court was unable to find any case law or leg-
islative history to support the argument that veterinary practice was in-
tended to be included within the phrase "medical" in the statutory provision 
and granted the veterinarian's motion for summary judgment to dismiss 
the action.9 
A California case illustrates a different approach. In Haverstock v. Hoge, 10 
the appellate court analyzed the relevant statute of limitations in a case 
where horses suffered from permanent injuries after receiving a vaccina-
tion. In California, veterinarians are considered health care providers.11 
The California code allows for actions against health care providers to be 
4. 674 N.W.2d 683 (table), 2003 WL 22807529 (Iowa Ct. App. 2003). 
5. IowA ConE§ 669.16 (2001), cited in Jovanovic, 2003 WL 22807529, at *1. 
6. Jovanovic, 2003 WL 22807 529, at *1. The Iowa Court of Appeals found thatjovanovic's 
motion to reconsider the issue was substantially similar to his response to the veterinary 
hospital's motion to dismiss and therefore did not toll the time for appeai.Jd. at *1-2. Since 
Jovanovic's appeal was not timely the court found that it was without jurisdiction to address 
the merits of the appeal. Id. 
7. 777 N.Y.S.2d 880 (Civ. Ct. 2004). The plaintiff jn this case brought a small claims 
action against the veterinarian alleging breach of warranty. Although a breach of warranty 
claim against a professional is not a cognizable claim in New York, the court found that the 
gravamen ofthe plaintiff's action is that the veterinarian engaged in professional malpractice. 
Id. at 882. 
8. ld. at 882 & nJ (citing and construing N.YC.P.L.R. § 214-a (McKinney 2003)). 
9. ld. at 882-83. The coun considered the amendment of the provision to include dentists 
and podiatrists, professions that are licensed to treat only hwnan beings. Id. 
I 0. No. E03l862, 2003 WL 1788787 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 4, 2003). 
11. Id. at *2 & n.l2. 
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taken one year from the date of discovery.12 In this case, the appellate court 
detertnined that the plaintiff's action was untimely because the horses 
showed visible manifestations of injwy immediately after the vaccine was 
administered. 13 
B. Evidentiary Issues 
Several recent cases have dealt with expert testimony in veterinary mal-
practice actions. The standard of care that is often applied to veterinary 
malpractice claims is that the injury complained of must be caused by the 
doing of a particular thing that a veterinarian of ordinary skill, care, and 
diligence would not have done under similar circumstances, or by the fail-
ure or omission to do some particular thing that such veterinarian would 
have done under similar circumstances. Expert testimony is generally re-
quired to determine whether a veterinarian has complied with this profes-
sional standard. 
The Texas case of McGee v. Smith 14 demonstrates this requirement. In 
McGee, a trial court had awarded a veterinarian's client $45,000 in con-
nection with the death of the client's mare and a foal, finding that the 
deaths were caused by the veterinarian's negligence. The Texas court em-
phasized that veterinary negligence cases would utilize the same standard 
as other medical malpractice cases.t 5 The court continued by stating that 
in a "medical malpractice action, expert testimony is required to prove 
negligence unless the form or mode of treattnent is a matter of common 
knowledge, or the matter is within the experience of a layperson. ''16 In the 
McGee case the client provided no expert testimony, and the court rendered 
a take-nothing judgment for the veterinarian.17 
In the California veterinary malpractice case of Petrosian v. Connor, 18 a 
plaintiff unsuccessfully argued that the defendant veterinarian's testimony 
was sufficient expert testimony to support a finding that the veterinarian 
breached the applicable standard of care and caused the damage. 19 The 
alleged negligence involved giving an injection to a horse immediately be-
fore the horse was to be transported. After reviewing the testimony of the 
12. CAL. Crv. Paoc. CooE §§ 340, 340.5 (West 2003). 
13. Haverstock, 2003 WL 1788787, at *4. 
14. 107 S.W.3d 725 (Tex. App. 2003). 
15. IJ. at 727 (citing Downing v. Gully, 915 S.W.2d 181, 183 (Tex. App. 1996)). 
16. IJ. 
17. IJ. at 727-28. The dissenting opinion argued that the alleged actions in this case (i.e., 
the plaintiff alleged that the horses died because the veterinarian failed to provide food and 
water for them) would support an ordinary negligence cause of action and thus should not 
require expert testimony. IJ. at 728 (Dauphinot, )., dissenting). 
18. No. D042510, 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 3861 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 20, 2004) 
(unpublished). 
19. IJ. at *9. The client had initially designated an expert witness but that witness was 
unavailable for trial. ld. at *4-5. 
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defendant veterinarian, the court concluded that the statements of the de-
fendant did not support a holding that his actions fell below the standard 
of care or were the cause-in-fact of the horse's injury.20 
It is important to note that many veterinary malpractice cases are at least 
initially brought in small claims court. An example of why this is important 
is the Ohio appellate court case of Lewis v. Hendrickson. 21 The plaintiffs' 
allegations related to the misdiagnosis of a tumor in a dog's ear as an 
infection. The evidence in the small claims court consisted of the plaintiffs' 
testimony about statements made by other veterinarians and a summary 
prepared by the clients and provided to the magistrate. The appellate court 
found that, although this testimony would not have been admissible under 
the rules of evidence, it could be considered by a trial court when it re-
viewed a magistrate's decision. Consequently, the appellate court upheld 
the judgment against the veterinarian. 22 
III. DAMAGES ISSUES 
Several state trial and appellate courts have recently considered how to 
value an animal in tort actions. 
A. Market Value and Intrinsic Value 
One case that has received a significant amount of attention is the Texas 
appellate court case of Petco Animal Supplies, Inc. v. Schuster. 23 In that case, 
Schuster brought her dog to a Petco store to be groomed. While the dog 
was under the control of Petco employees, it slipped its leash and ran 
away. 24 The dog was found dead four days later, apparently run over by a 
car. Schuster sued for breach of contract, gross negligence, and conversion. 
Petco did not answer and Schuster took a default judgment. The only issue 
on appeal was the type of damages awarded to Schuster by the district 
court. 25 Based on a breach of contract theory, the court allowed damages 
for the replacement value of the dog, reimbursement for the expenses for 
training and microchip implantation,26 and attorney fees and court costs, 
but rejected additional damages awarded by the trial court for mental an-
20. ld. at *10-11. 
21. No. 02CA18t 2003 WL 21652177 (Ohio Ct. App. June 27 t 2003). 
22. ld. at *4. The trial conn held that the magisttate's decision was based on a breach of 
contract theory. The appellate court disagreed, viewing it as a veterinary malpractice action. 
Regardless, the plaintiffs' burden was the same under both theories: they needed to prove 
that the veterinarian should have discovered the rumor. I d. at *3. 
23. 144 S.W.3d 554 (Tex. App. 2004). 
24. ld. at 557. Schuster actually saw the dog running away from the store through the 
surrounding high-traffic area when she was returning to pick up the dog. 
25. ld. at 558. 
26. ld. Petco did not appeal the award of damages for replacement value or reimbursement 
for n aining and microchip implantation. 
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guish, the expense of counseling, the "intrinsic value" loss of companion-
ship, lost wages, and exemplary damages.27 Of these damages, the analysis 
of the "intrinsic value" loss of companionship claim is the most relevant to 
the tort claims. 
The appellate court began its analysis with the traditional classification 
of dogs as personal property for damage purposes. Under existing Texas 
law, damages for the loss of a dog would be limited as follows: "It may be 
either a market value, if the dog has any, or some special or pecuniary value 
to the owner, that may be ascertained by reference to the usefulness and 
services of the dog."28 This special or pecuniary value refers "solely to 
economic value derived from the dog's usefulness and services, not value 
atttibuted to companionship or other sentimental considerations. "29 In cer-
2 7. The court stated that it was unclear whether the claims for mental anguish damages 
were attributed to the tort or contract claims. Focusing on the contract claims, the court 
rejected the mental anguish damages. I d. at 5 62-63. The award for counseling expenses was 
reversed, because the court held that Schuster could not recover for emotional harrn. Id. at 
563. The court also held that lost wages were not properly recoverable under Schuster's tort 
theory, and insufficiently connected to Petco's conduct to be recoverable under a contract 
theory. I d. at 5 65-66. 
28. Id. at 561 (quoting Heiligmann v. Rose, 16 S.W. 931, 932 (Tex. 189l)).ln determining 
an animal's "market value" for the purpose of establishing the amount of damages, courts 
historically have looked to the value before and after the loss. For example, in Collins v. 
Ubanoski, No. B14-88-00461-CV, 1989 Tex. App. LEXIS 2739 (Tex. App. 1989), the issue 
was the market value of a steer that died after a dehorning procedure. The court in that case 
defined "market value" as "the amount that would be paid in cash by a willing buyer who 
desires to buy, but is not required to buy, to a willing seller who desires to sell, but is under 
no necessity of selling." ld. at *4. The court also noted that "market value" can include 
consideration of "the highest and best use to which the animal may have been used." Id. See 
also Schrubbe v. Peninsula Veterinary Serv. Inc., 5 52 N.W.2d 634, 636 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996) 
(quoting Rosche v. Wayne Feed Div., Cont'l Grain Co., 447 N.W.2d 94, 96 (Wis. Ct. App. 
1989)) (''The basic measure of damages for the destruction of livestock is the animal's market 
value, determined by replacement cost, with an appropriate reduction for any salvage value."). 
Other courts have utilized more flexible standards in detennining value, while continuing to 
reference market value as the usual standard. In McDonald v. Ohio State Univ. Veterinary Hosp., 
644 N.E.2d 7 50 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 1994), a highly trained and pedigreed Gennan shepherd suf-
fered paralysis after surgery. Although the court began its analysis with market value, it con-
sidered several factors in detennining the value of the dog, including specialized training, 
awards, and titles, as well as the stud services of the dog, and the plaintiff's efforts to reha-
bilitate the paralyzed animal. In the end, the court awarded $5,000 in damages for the dog's 
loss. Damages for "future conditions where they are reasonably certain to occur or exist in 
the furure," such as potential earnings, can be awarded. ld. at 752. In this context, a common 
type of future earnings would be the breeding services to be provided by such animals. 
29. Petco, 144 S.W.3d at 561. In some states, if there is no market value, the value to the 
owner for property may be awarded. In Impala v. Pet's Choice, Inc., No. 04-2-04-04710-8, 
slip op. (Wash. Sup. Ct., Pierce Co., Oct. 19, 2004), an arbitrator awarded $900 to the plaintiff 
in a case where a veterinary clinic mistakenly cremated a dog's remains along with other 
animals. The plaintiff had specifically requested an individual cremation and sued the veter-
inary clinic under a variety of theories. Although the trial court ruled that damages were not 
recoverable under plaintiff's negligence theories, the defense stipulated to negligence. The 
final settlement in this case was for $2,700. E-Mail from Adam Karp, Attorney for the Plain-
riff, to Rebecca Huss, Professor of Law, Valparaiso University (Nov. 9, 2004, 3:25PM CSl) 
(on file with author). 
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tain instances, Texas law permits the recovery of ''intrinsic value" as the 
measure of property damages; however, the Petco court rejected the ap-
plication of intrinsic value here, declining to expand this type of damage 
to include "the subjective value that a dog's owner places on its compan-
ionship."30 The court held that intrinsic value damages are only available 
if the property is shown to have neither market value nor replacement 
value, while in this case Schuster testified that the dog's replacement value 
was $500.31 
However, the "unique value" of a dog was awarded in the recent Cali-
fornia superior court case of Bluestone v. Bergstrom. 32 The Bluestone case 
involved several claims but was essentially a veterinary malpractice case 
relating to the treatment of a dog for seizures.33 The jury instructions asked 
the jury to first consider whether the dog had any market value, then 
whether the dog had special or unique value to his owner.34 The jury in-
struction was based on California Civil Code Provision Section 3 3 55, 
which provides that if an item had some market value but had unique value 
to the plaintiff and the defendant either had notice of the unique value 
before the hartn or knew that the conduct was intentional and wrongful, 
the unique value could be the measure of damages. After finding that the 
dog had a market value of $10 but had special or unique value to the owner, 
the jury found that the veterinarian had notice of such special and unique 
value. Using these jury instructions, the jury found a special value for the 
dog of $30,000.35 
B. Veterinary Costs 
Plaintiffs may successfully obtain damages consisting of the veterinary ex-
penses incurred because of tortious conduct. An example is the 2003 New 
30. Petco, 144 S.W.3d at 565. The Iowa Supreme Court rejected the intrinsic value ap-
proach in Nichols v. Sukaro Kennels, 555 N.W2d 689, 690-92 (Iowa 1996). The injured dog 
in Nichols was a toy poodle that had had her left front leg and shoulder blade tom off by the 
kennel owner's dog. The Iowa Supreme Court held that the intrinsic value of the dog would 
not be considered in awarding damages for injuries to the dog. The court stated that there 
was no evidence that the dog had a special purpose. The court also noted that the Nichols 
still enjoyed the companionship of their pet because a three-legged dog and a four-legged 
dog had the same market value. 
31. Petco, 144 S.W.3d at 565. 
32. No. OOCC00796 (Cal. Sup. Ct., Orange Co., 2003). SeeR. Scott Nolen, Calij01nia Dog 
Owner Awarded $39,000 in Vete1"inary Malpractice Suit,}. AMER. VETERINARY. MEn. Ass'N, Apr. 
15, 2004, available at http:/ /www.avma.org/onlnews/javma/apr04/040415e.asp. 
3 3. The complaint included claims of negligence, trespass to chattel, conversion, deceit, 
and a breach of the California Unfair Business Practice starute. The client spent over $20,000 
on the treatment for the dog. Fourth Amended Complaint, Bluestone, No. OOCC00796 (copy 
on file with author). 
34. Jury InstrUction, Special Verdict No. 2, Bluestone, No. OOCC00796 (copy on file with 
author). 
3 5. ld. Damages for unreasonable amounts paid to the veterinary clinic were also awarded 
to the plaintiff. 
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York case of Mercurio v. Weber. 36 In Mercurio, a dog groomer did not contest 
liability for negligently injuring one dog and killing another. The only 
question was the appropriate measure of damages, which the court held 
included veterinary costs incurred for the care of both dogs and the re-
placement value for the deceased dog.37 
C. Loss of Companionship 
Courts have declined to allow recovery for loss of companionship for the 
death or injury of a pet.38 The recent Washington case of Pickford v. Ma-
sion 39 is illustrative. The Pickfords' small dog suffered pertnanent injuries 
after being attacked at his home by two large dogs that had escaped from 
a neighbor's yard. The court declined to allow for loss of companionship 
damages, finding that such an extension would be more appropriately made 
by the legislature. 40 
A few courts, however, have allowed loss of companionship to be con-
sidered as an element in determining the value of an animal. A recent 
example is the Mercurio case discussed above, where the court found that 
the replacement cost of the dog encompassed the loss of companionship.41 
36. Index No. SC1113/03, 2003 WL 21497325 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. June 20, 2003) (unpub-
lished). 
3 7. ld. at *2-3. 
38. See, e.g., Ammon v. Welty, 113 S.W.3d 185, 187-88 (Ky. Ct. App. 2002) (declining to 
allow damages for loss of consortium and pointing to the lack of a familial relationship in 
case where a dog was destroyed by a dog warden prior to the expiration of a statutory seven-
day waiting period); Krasnecky v. Meffen, 777 N.E.2d 1286, 1289 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002), re:v. 
denied, 782 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 2003) (holding that plaintiff could not seek loss of consortium 
damages where seven sheep that were considered companion animals were allegedly killed 
by the defendants' dogs); Koester v. VCA Animal Hosp., 624 N.W.2d 209, 211 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 2000) (declining to create an independent cause of action for loss of companionship); 
Gluckman v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 844 F. Supp. 151, 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (dismissing a loss of 
companionship claim and distinguishing Brousseau v. Rosenthal, 443 N.Y.S.2d 285 (N.Y. Civ. 
Ct. 1980), which had allowed a pet's companionship to be used as a factor to assess a dog's 
actual value to an owner); Oberschlake v. Veterinary Assocs. Animal Hosp., 785 N.E.2d 811 
(Ohio Ct. App. 2003) (finding no authority in Ohio that would allow recovery for loss of 
companionship of animals); Daughen v. Fox, 539 A.2d 858, 865 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) ("Under 
no circumstances, under the law of Pennsylvania, may there be recovery for loss of compan-
ionship due to the death of an animal."). 
39. 98 P.3d 1232 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004). 
40. ld. at 1235. The court found that "damages are recoverable for the actual or intrinsic 
value of lost property but not for sentimental value." ld. The Picltford court also rejected the 
claim for emotional distress damages. ld. at 1234-35. 
41. Mn-curio, 2003 WL 21497325, at *2. In this area, Mercurio followed the reasoning of 
Brousseau, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 285, discussed supra at note 38, which has been distinguished by 
other New York couns. Mercurio, 2003 WL 21497325, at *2. See also Jankoski v. Preiser 
Animal Hosp., 510 N.E.2d 1084, 1087 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (affirming that the loss of com-
panionship could be used as an element in determining damages in a property damage case, 
similar to the treatment of other items of sentimental value, such as heirlooms and photo-
graphs, but refusing to extend an independent cause of action for loss of companionship). 
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D. Emotional Distress 
Several recent cases analyzed the availability of emotional distress damages 
in connection with the injury to or death of an animal.42 These cases can 
be divided into negligent and intentional claims. 
1. Negligent 
Some recent cases have relied upon prior case law to hold that emotional 
distress damages are unavailable in cases involving the negligent death of 
an animal. For example, in Mercurio, discussed above, the court noted, "It 
is well established that a pet owner in New York cannot recover damages 
for emotional distress caused by the negligent desttuction of a dog. "43 
The Ohio case of Oberschlake v. Veterinary Associates Animal Hospital44 is 
another example of how many states treat claims of negligent infliction of 
emotional distress relating to the injury to or death of an animal. In that 
case, a veterinarian began a spaying procedure on a dog that was at the 
clinic for a teeth cleaning and that had been previously spayed. The Ober-
42. The ability t<_? recover damages for emotional distress depends on widely varying state 
laws. Some states have allowed claims based on damage to property, while others have held 
that the destruction of property will not support claims ofemotional distress. Compare Camp-
bell v. Animal Quarantine Station, 63 2 P.2d 1066, 1060-71 (Haw. 1981) (allowing distress 
claims based on harm to property) with Fackler v. Genetzky, 595 N.W.2d 884, 891-92 (Neb. 
1999) (finding that Nebraska law did not allow recovery for emotional damages resulting 
from the negligent destruction of property and, more specifically, holding that "damages for 
mental suffering or emotional distress may not be recovered for the negligently inflicted death 
of an animal"). One argument that has been raised to attempt to circumvent the restrictions 
on recovering damages for the loss of personal property is the theory of "constitutive prop-
erty," which provides that "ownership or possession of certain personal property, like a pet, 
can become a central aspect of the owner's sense of identity." Lockett v. Hill, 51 P.3d 5, 7 
(Or. Ct. App. 2002). See, e.g., Paprocki v. Nolet, No. 01AS02905 (Cal. Super. Ct., Sacramento 
Co., 2002) (constirutive property argument unsuccessful); Kramecky, 777 N.E.2d at 1289 
(utilizing existing temporal and spatial proximity requirements in Massachusetts law to dis-
allow claims of emotional distress, and declining to consider the expansion of the class of 
persons allowed to recover for emotional distress to companion animals); Harabes v. Barkery, 
Inc., 791 A2d 1142, 1143-46 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2001) (setting forth arguments for 
and against allowing emotional distress damages for the loss of pets in a negligence action 
against a groomer and finding that allowing such damages would "proceed upon a course that 
had no just stopping point"); Zeid v. Pearce, 953 S.W2d 368, 370 (fex. App. 1997) (holding 
that the rule forbidding damages for bystander recovery for mental anguish in medical mal-
practice cases should likewise apply to veterinary malpractice cases); Rabideau v. Racine, 62 7 
N.W2d 795, 802, 806 (Wis. 2001) (holding that negligent damage to property cannot be 
used to maintain a claim for emotional distress, although recognizing that the argument was 
made in good faith for an extension of existing law and was not frivolous). 
43. Mercurio, 2003 WL 21497325, at *2 (quoting Jason v. Parks, 638 N.Y.S.2d 170, 171 
(App. Div. 1996)). The court continued: "If plaintiff could recover for the emotional distress 
of losing her dog, such logic could be extended to allow recovery for emotional distress caused 
by the destruction of other sentimental items like family heirlooms, class rings or old pic-
ru.res." ld. 
44. 785 N.E.2d 811 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003) (stating that Ohio does not recognize noneco-
nomic damages for injuries to companion animals in a veterinary malpractice case). 
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schlakes were not satisfied with the award of the arbitration panel that 
heard the veterinary malpractice action and filed suit, requesting compen-
sation for their own emotional distress, among other claims.45 The Ober-
schlakes conceded that "dogs are currendy classified as personal property 
under Ohio law and that the law does not recognize non-economic dam-
ages for personal property."46 The Oberschlake court reiterated that Ohio 
"does not recognize noneconomic damages for injury to companion ani-
mals."47 Furthermore, even if such damages were allowed, Ohio law limits 
recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress using a bystander 
rule, which requires that a plaintiff must actually observe an accident and 
suffer a severe and debilitating emotional injury.48 
The Ohio appellate court reaffirmed its holding regarding noneconomic 
damages in Oberschlake in the case of Pacher v. Invisible Fence of Dayton,49 
where the plaintiffs claimed that the defendant's negligence in the instal-
lation of an invisible fence injured their dog. 50 The Pachers aclmowledged 
that Oberschlake was controlling law, but asked the court to consider what 
was in the best interests of companion animals and asserted that an award 
of noneconomic damages would deter future misconduct.51 The Pacher 
court reiterated the restrictions of the bystander rule, and continued to 
reject recovery for noneconomic damages for the loss of or injury to 
animals.52 
The Florida veterinary malpractice case of Kennedy v. Byas 53 also utilized 
the general limits on negligent infliction of emotional distress damages to 
uphold a partial summary judgment motion and found that, even if all of 
the allegations were proven, emotional distress damages would not be re-
coverable. Kennedy held that the "impact rule," which requires that the 
plaintiff suffered a physical impact as a predicate to the recovery of emo-
45. ld. at 812. The veterinary malpractice claim was referred to an arbitration panel, which 
awarded compensatory damages of $104.28, the costs of the action, and the arbitration fee 
of $250. The plaintiffs had also claimed that the veterinary malpractice had caused the dog 
pain and suffering and emotional distress. The appellate court affinned the trial court's dis-
missal of the claims for the dog's emotional distress, finding that "a dog cannot recover for 
emotional distress or indeed for any other direct claims of which we are aware." /d. at 814. 
46. Id. at 812. 
47. ld. at 814. 
48. ld. 
49. 798 N.E.2d 1121 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003). 
50. The dog suffered from bums and sores from the collar. ld. at 1125. The lower coun 
had awarded a judgment of $1,714 against the fence company for negligence and breach of 
contract. 
51. Id. at 1123, 1126. 
52. ld. at 1125. 
53. 867 So. 2d 1195, 1196 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004). There are no facts in the appellate 
opinion describing the alleged malpractice other than that the treattnent was for a basset 
hound. 
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tional distress damages, 54 precluded the recovery by a dog owner for emo-
tional distress damages in a veterinary malpractice case.55 Although the 
court acknowledged a split of authority on the question of emotional dis-
tress damages for veterinary malpractice, it concluded that under Florida 
law animals are considered personal property and so cannot serve as an 
exception to the impact rule. 56 
The extent of the injury necessary to support a negligent infliction of 
emotional distress claim was at issue in the Connecticut case of Rees v. 
Flaherty,S7 where a kennel lost a dog and the plaintiff-owner claimed neg-
ligent infliction of emotional distress. 58 Because Connecticut has a by-
stander rule that would preclude recovery if the injury was to property, the 
plaintiff-owner claimed that her allegation of emotional distress did not 
relate to the injury of losing the dog, but to the actions of the defendant 
after the loss of the dog. Among other allegations, the plaintiff claimed 
that the defendant did not search for the dog, treated the plaintiff rudely 
and callously, and did not contact the plaintiff until eight days after the loss 
of the dog. The court reiterated that the conduct must be "extreme and 
outrageous"59 and involve an unreasonable risk of causing emotional dis-
tress that might result in illness or bodily harm. The court found that the 
allegations made by the plaintiff-owner merely fell within a "field of bad 
54. ld. at 1197. 
55. ld. at 1197-98 (distinguishing La Porte v. Associated lndeps. Inc., 163 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 
1964)). The Kmnedy coun drew the example of injury to a child caused by malpractice. 
56. I d. at 1198. See Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Recovery of Damages for Emotional DiJty·ess 
Due to Treatment of Pets, 91 A.L.R. 5th 545, §§ 3 and 4 (2001). See also McAdams v. Faulk, 
No. CAOl-1350; 2002 Ark. App. LEXIS 258, at *13-14 (Ark. Ct. App. 2002) (reversing a 
trial court's dismissal of a complaint against a veterinarian for negligence and malpractice and 
stating that "damages on a negligence claim are not limited (to] economic loss damages, and 
include compensation for mental anguish"); Johnson v. Wander, 592 So. 2d 1225, 1226 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (providing that a dog owner's claim for mental pain and suffering pre-
sented a question for the jury in a case where a veterinarian allegedly left a dog on a heating 
pad for a long period of time, resulting in serious bums to the animal). But see Koester v. 
VCA Animal Hosp., 624 N.W.2d 209, 211 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000) (expressing sympathy for 
the plaintiff's position regarding emotional distress but deferring to the legislarure to create 
such a remedy); Soto v. United States, 63 Fed. Appx. 197 (6th Cir. 2003) (emotional distress 
claim affirmed; remanded for further proceedings on the value of personal property); Lamare 
v. N. Country Animal League, 743 A.2d 598, 605 (Vt. 1999) (stating that "this is not to say 
that a future case seeking recovery for the emotional distress or other damages resulting from 
the negligent handling of an impounded animal a claim not alleged here would be un-
successful"). The Lamare case can be distinguished from many of the other cases discussed 
in this section because no injury was inflicted on the animal. ld. at 599-600. In Lamare, a 
dog was allowed to be adopted even though an owner had been identified and had taken 
measures to reclaim the dog. Id. 
57. No. CV010077316, 2003 WL 462868 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 6, 2003) (unpublished). 
58. ld. at *1. 
59. ld. (quoting Muniz v. Kravis, 757 A2d 1207, 1211 (Conn. App. Ct. 2000)). 
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manners,"60 and thus would not support a cause of action for negligent 
infliction of emotional distress. 61 
A recent Connecticut case analyzed whether there could be circum-
stances under which emotional distress damages could ever be assessed in 
a pet case. In Liotta v. Segar,62 the plaintiff alleged that a groomer's neg-
ligent handling of her dog injured it so severely that the dog ultimately 
had to be euthanized. The coun granted summary judgment against the 
plaintiff on her claim for mental anguish and severe emotional distress. 
The court listed various ways that an animal could be involved in a case 
alleging emotional distress, including the possibility that an animal was 
ham1ed "for the sole reason of visiting misery upon one who loves an 
animal. "63 In dictum, the court considered Connecticut cases that allowed 
for emotional distress claims when "defendant should have realized that its 
conduct involved an unreasonable risk of causing the distress, and ... 
should have realized that [such] distress ... might result in illness or bodily 
harm.''64 Notwithstanding the possible opening for a plaintiff, the court 
recognized that there were significant hurdles for any such cause of action, 
including the fact that the plaintiff might still be seen as a bystander and 
the "inhospitable" response in Connecticut courts to emotional distress 
claims emanating from property damage.65 
2. Intentional 
There have been several recent cases where plaintiffs have made claims for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress due to the death of or injury to 
animals.66 The California case of Harasymiv v. veterinary Surgical Associ-
60. ld. (quoting Scanlon v. Conn. Light & Power, 782 A.2d 87, 94 n.l5 (Conn. 2001)). 
61. ld. at *1-2. 
62. No. CV020347756S, 2004 WL 728829 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 15, 2004) (unpub-
lished). 
63. ld. at *1. 
64. ld. at *2 (quoting Montinieri v. S. New England Tel. Co., 398 A2d 1180, 1183 (Conn. 
1978)). 
65. ld. 
66. A Kentucky court of appeals found that punitive damages for claims based on inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress would not be precluded simply because the underlying 
facts involved an animal. Burgess v. Taylor, 44 S.W.3d 806, 812-13 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001). The 
facts supporting this claim included repeated lying on the part of the defendants as to the 
starus of the animals. ld. at 810. In Kautzman v. McDonald, 621 N.W.2d 871 (N.D. 2001), 
the North Dakota Supreme Court found that the conduct of police officers who shot and 
killed five dogs was not within the parameters of the ton of intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, but reinstated the negligence claim.IJ. at 877-80. Similarly, in Richardson v. Fairbanlcs 
N. Star Borough, 705 P.2d 454, 456 (Alaska 1985), the Alaska Supreme Court stated that it 
was "willing to recognize a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress for 
the intentional or reckless killing of a pet animal in an appropriate case." That court recently 
reaffirnted its willingness to support a claim of emotional distress for the loss of a pet, in 
Mitchell v. Heinrichs, 27 P.3d 309, 311-12 (Alaska 2001), although it held that the particular 
facts of that case did not support such a claim. For an Idaho coun decision addressing claims 
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ates67 provides an example of the relatively rare veterinary malpractice case 
in which intentional infliction of emotional distress was also claimed. In 
this case, a veterinarian allegedly yelled at a client for walking a dog after 
it had surgery to repair a ruptured disc in its neck. As a result of being 
walked, the dog required a second surgery to repair the damage, developed 
an infection, and died. 68 The court discussed the factors necessary to sup-
port a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress: 
"(1) defendant engaged in outrageous conduct; (2) defendant intended to 
cause emotional distress or acted in reckless disregard of the probability of 
causing emotional distress; (3) plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress; 
and ( 4) defendanes outrageous conduct was the actual and proximate cause 
of the plaintiff's injury."69 Distinguishing between the conduct toward the 
dog and the conduct toward the owner, the court found that the plaintiff's 
allegations did not meet the standard of outrageous conduct. 70 
There have been a few recent successful claims for emotional distress 
damages. In the Washington Superior Court case of Cox v. Gupti/,71 the 
defendant obtained possession of a horse and three goats under false pre-
tences. The agreement was a "free lease," transferring possession of the 
animals but expressly providing that the animals would never be sold or 
given away, and if the animals were no longer wanted by the defendant 
of emotional distress stemming from animal loss, see Gill v. BrO'lJJ1'l, 695 P.2d 1276, 1277-78 
(Idaho Ct. App. 1985), which held that a lower court erred in striking a claim for damages 
caused by mental anguish for the alleged killing of a pet donkey. Conduct usually must be 
extreme and outrageous in order to support claims of intentional infliction of emotional 
distress. See Carroll v. Rock, 469 S.E.2d 391, 394 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (discussing the level 
of conduct necessary to support a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress against 
a veterinarian when a client's cat escaped while under the veterinarian's care); see also Katsaris 
v. Cook, 225 Cal. Rptr. 531, 536-38 (Ct. App. 1986) (discussing the test of extreme and 
outrageous conduct in a case in which two dogs were shot and remanding to deterntine if 
post-shooting conduct supported the claim). The Katsaris case had a strong dissenting opinion 
interpreting the statute that provided immunity from the killing of animals harassing livestock. 
ld. at 538 (Sabraw,J., dissenting) ("Not only is [the dog] more than property today, he is the 
subject of sonnets, the object of song, the symbol of loyalty. Indeed, he is man's best friend."). 
67. No. A100269, 2003 WL 22183946 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 23, 2003) (unpublished). See 
also Miller v. Peraino, 626 A.2d 63 7, 641 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (distinguishing conduct toward 
the animal and other conduct that would support a claim of intentional infliction of emotional 
distress and finding that statement by the veterinarian did not support a claim for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress in this case). A more recent Pennsylvania case dismissed claims 
for intentional infliction of emotional distress when a police officer shot a dog because the 
plaintiffs were not present at the time of the incident. Copenhaver v. Borough of Bernville, 
No. 02-8398, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1315 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 9, 2003). 
68. Harasymiv, 2003 WL 22183946, at *1. 
69. ld. at *2. 
70. IJ. at *3. 
71. No. 01-2-08863-5, Default Judgment (Wash. Super. Ct., Snohomish Co., May 19, 
2003). See also Valerie Bittner, Local Case Update: Cox v. GuptiJ, ANIMAL LAw SEcnoN 
NEWSL'l"R. (Wash. St. Bar Ass'n Animal Law Section), Fall 2003, at 8, available at http:// 
www. wsba.orgllawyers/ groups/ animallaw/animallawnewsletter 3vol1. pdf. 
• 
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they would be rerumed to the plaintiffs. The court found that the defen-
dant's conduct of selling the animals for slaughter was intentional and 
willful, exceeding all bounds of decency, where the defendant knew of the 
plaintiffs' emotional bonds with the animals.72 The court awarded general 
emotional damages totaling $2 5,000 between the two plaintiffs, in addition 
to damages for loss of business and for the value of the animals. 73 
A second Washington case also related to the killing of a horse. In Roe 
v. Barteis,74 the defendant had pleaded guilty to first-degree animal cruelty 
and first-degree burglary arising from intentionally killing a horse. In ad-
dition to other damages, the court awarded $5,000 in emotional distress 
damages based on a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim. 75 
E. Punitive Damages 
In a few recent cases, courts have awarded punitive damages for the injury 
to or death of an animal when a tortfeaser has acted with gross negligence, 
maliciously, willfully, or with a wanton disregard of the rights of others.76 
In the Petco case, the lower court awarded $10,000 in exemplarydamages.77 
The appellate court stated that Schuster would need to show by "clear and 
convincing evidence that the harm that she suffered was caused by fraud 
or malice on the part of Petco" and reversed the lower court's award of 
exemplary damages.78 
72. Cox, No. 01-2-08863-5, slip op. at 2. 
73. The loss of business damages were $8,328; the value of the animals was $876. Cox, No. 
01-2-08863-5, slip op. at 4. 
74. No. 03-2-06204-4, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law & Summary ofJudgment 
(Wash. Super. Ct., Pierce Co., June 11, 2004). 
75. Id., No. 03-2-06204-4, slip op. at 3-4. The other damages included the fair market 
value of the horse, medical special damages, transportation fee, lost stud fees, and attorney 
fees and costs. ld. In a similar case, an Oregon trial court allowed a jury to consider claims 
for intentional infliction of emotional distress and conversion in a case against the estate of 
a man who was accused of poisoning four dogs.Ingerwerson v. Estate ofJerry \Vhinnan, No. 
02CV0140, Special Jury Verdict (Or. Cir. Ct., Curry Co., Sept. 12, 2002). In that case, the 
jury awarded $13 5,000 in noneconomic damages to the plaintiffs. ld. 
76. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Henrichs, 27 P.3d 309, 311 (Alaska 2001) (discussing the type of 
offensive conduct that would support punitive damages); McAdams v. Faulk, No. CAOl-1350, 
2002 Ark. App. LEXIS 258, at *13-14 (Ark. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2002) (reversing a trial coun's 
dismissal of a complaint against a veterinarian for negligence and malpractice and noting that 
"punitive damages are recoverable on a malpractice claim"); Wilson v. City of Eagan, 297 
N.W.2d 146, 150-51 (Minn. 1980) (finding that punitive damages were appropriate in a case 
against an animal warden who had intentionally killed a cat in violation of an ordinance and 
statute, although the jury verdict of $2,000 in punitive damages was reduced to $500); Mo-
lenaar v. United Cattle Co., 553 N.W.2d 424,426,428-30 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996) (discussing 
the availability of punitive damages in a personal property action in which sixty-five heifers 
were converted and punitive damages in the amount of $400,000 were awarded by the jury); 
Propes v. Griffith, 25 S.W.3d 544, 547, 550-51 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000) (upholding an award of 
$2,000 in actual damages and $4,000 in punitive damages for the euthanization of two dogs 
by a person who was untruthful about her ownership of the dogs and committed other ma-
licious, willful, and intentional conduct). 
77. Petco Animal Supplies, Inc. v. Schuster, 144 S.W3d 554 (Tex. App. 2004). 
78. ld. at 566. 
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IV. LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITY 
A. Maryland 
Some states by statute permit recovery of veterinary expenses. Often these 
statutes are limited to service animals, with the stated purpose of providing 
restitution to the disabled persons being assisted by such animals.79 One 
example of a statute with a broader general applicability is the Maryland 
statute, which provides that the measure of damages in the tortious injury 
to or death of pets is "the market value of the pet before the injury or death 
or the reasonable cost of veterinary care, but not more than $5,000 if such 
charge is greater."80 An attempt to increase the damage limit to $10,000 
failed in 2004.81 
• 
B. Tennessee 
Recently, there have been proposals for statutory provisions that would 
establish a right to sue for damages, including noneconomic damages, for 
the death of or injury to animals. Such statutes generally focus on domes-
ticated companion animals. The proposals for these statutes commonly 
occur after widely publicized cases involving the intentional killing of com-
panion animals. Tennessee adopted such a statute in 2000.82 The statute 
pernlits noneconomic damages of up to $4,000 if a person's pet is killed or 
sustains injuries that result in the death of the animal while the animal was 
within the direct control or supervision of its owner or on the owner's 
79. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CoDE§§ 600.2, 600.5 (West 2003) (providing restitution in the 
amount of the veterinary bills and replacement cost of the assistance dog if the dog is disabled 
or killed either by a person or by another dog); 740 hL. CoMP. STAT. 13/10 (2004) (allowing 
economic and noneconomic recovery where economic damages include, but are not limited 
to, veterinary, retraining, and replacement costs); MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 272, § 85B (2004) 
(allowing a physically impaired person to bring an action for economic or noneconomic 
damages against a person who steals or attacks an assistance animal, effective Aug. 18, 2004); 
NEv. REv. STAT. § 426.810 (2004) (allowing for restitution for service animal if the service 
animal is killed or disabled by another animal, effective Oct. 1, 2003); N.Y. GEN. OsLIG. LAw 
§ 11-107 (McKinney 2003) (providing for damages consisting of veterinary costs, retraining 
or replacement costs, and lost wages or damages due to the loss of mobility incurred while 
retraining or replacement takes place); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 30.822 & 346.687 (2003) (allowing 
economic damages including temporary replacement services, veterinary expenses, and any 
other cost and expense incurred as a result of the theft of or injury to designated animals); 
TEX. PENAL ConE§ 42.091 (allowing for restitution for veterinary and other costs if a defen-
dant is convicted of attacking an assistance animal); UTAH CoDE ANN.§§ 76-9-307 & 78-
20-102 (2004) (providing for damages that included veterinary expenses, replacement ser-
vices, and costs incurred due to the injury to or theft of an assistance animal). 
80. Mo. ConE ANN., CTs. & juo. Paoc. § 11-IIO(h) (2002). 
81. H. B. 1145, 418th Sess. of the Gen. Assembly (Md. 2004). Earlier versions of the leg-
islation allowed for punitive damages and expanded the scope of the provision to include 
persons who negligently injure or cause the death of a pet. ld. This bill is expected to be 
reintroduced in the 2004-2005 legislative session. 
82. TENN. CooE ANN. § 44-17-403(e) (2004). A pet is defined as "any domesticated dog 
or cat nonnally maintained in or near the household of its owner." I d., § 44-17 -403(b). 
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prernises.83 The noneconomic damages awarded pursuant to the section 
are limited to "compensation for the loss of the reasonably expected society, 
companionship, love and affection of the pet.''84 The Tennessee statute is 
particularly notable because it allows for such damages for intentional or 
negligent acts so long as such act was unlawful. 85 
C. Conneaicut 
Connecticut recendy followed the Tennessee model and enacted a similar 
statute, pernlitting recovery of specified damages if a companion animal is 
intentionally killed or injured. An owner of the companion animal can 
collect economic damages consisting of veterinary expenses, the fair mon-
etary value of the animal, and burial expenses. The court may assess pu-
nitive damages under the Connecticut provision (limited to the monetary 
limit for small claims currently $3,500) as well as reasonable attorney 
fees.86 
D. Illinois 
Illinois also has a specific provision allowing for civil actions for the injury 
to or death of an anin1al, but it applies only if the animal is injured or killed 
under certain circumstances.87 Specifically, the animal must have been sub-
ject to an act of aggravated cruelty or torture or have been impounded in 
bad faith. If the act is applicable, allowable damages include, but are not 
limited to, "the monetary value of the animal, veterinary expenses incurred 
on behalf of the animal, any other expenses incurred by the owner in rec-
tifying the effects of the cruelty, pain and suffering of the animal, and 
emotional distress suffered by the owner."88 Punitive damages of not less 
than $500 or more than $25,000 are available for each act of abuse or 
neglect. 
83. ld. § 44-17-403(a). Among other exclusions, the section does not apply to counties 
with a population of less than 7 5,000 or to professional negligence actions against licensed 
veterinarians. ld., § 44-17-403(e) & (f). 
84. ld. § 44-17 -403(d). The limits for noneconomic damages "shall not apply to causes 
of action for the intentional infliction of emotional distress or any other civil action other 
than the direct and sole loss of a pet." ld. § 44-17 -403(c). 
85. ld. §44-17-403(a). 
86. 2004 Conn. Legis. Serv. Public Act 04-239 (H.B. 5606) (West), amending CoNN. GEN. 
STAT. § 22-351 (2004), available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/2004/act/Pa/2004PA-00239-ROO 
HB-05606-PA.hun. The definition of companion animal in the Connecticut act is similar to 
Tennessee's provision, with additional clarifying language that the definition of companion 
animal does not include a dog or cat kept for farming or biomedical research practices. 
87. 510 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. 70/16.3 (2004) (providing for damages in civil actions 
against persons who have acted in bad faith in seizing or impounding animals or who have 
been convicted of certain felony animal welfare provisions). 
88. ld. 
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E .. Proposed Legislation 
Several other states have considered similar legislation in this area. Pro-
posed legislation in New Jersey that was reported out of committee con-
ditions availability of the civil remedy on the animal having been subjected 
to an act of cruelty.89 Pecuniary damages are available, but language pro-
viding for emotional distress and loss of companionship damages was de-
leted during the legislative process. 90 
Two bills were introduced in New York and are expected to be active in 
this year's session of the state legislature. One is quite similar to the existing 
law in Tennessee, allowing for noneconomic damages if an animal is killed 
or seriously injured while it is on the owner's premises or under the direct 
control of the owner, and if the tortfeaser's act was unlawful and inten-
tional, reckless, or negligent.91 Another New York bill allows for extensive 
damages for the intentional, reckless, or negligent injury to or death of a 
companion animal.92 Allowable damages include unlimited damages for the 
loss of reasonably expected society and companionship, emotional distress, 
and reasonable burial costs. The bill also allows for minimal punitive dam-
ages of $2,500 for intentional or reckless conduct.93 
Other states with recent legislative activity include California, Colorado, 
Mississippi, and Rhode Island, 94 although it should be noted that some of 
the proposed provisions have made very little progress in the legislature. 
For example, legislation in Colorado was killed by its own sponsor after 
negative publicity and a rapid response by the state veterinary medical 
association. 95 
89. S.B. 2012, A.B. 2411, 21lth Legislamre (N.J. 2004), available at http://www.njleg. 
state.nj.us/2004/Bills/S2500/2012_Il.HTM. The bill remains active. 
90. ld. Pecuniary damages include "the monetary value of the animal, replacement value 
of the animal, breeding potential of the animal, veterinary expenses incurred by the owner in 
tteating the animal, reasonable burial or cremation expenses, reimbursement of animal u ain-
ing expenses, any unique or special value of the animal such as a guide or service animal, and 
lost wages incurred by the owner due to the loss or disability of the animaL ]d. Earlier versions 
of the provision allowed for loss of companionship damages up to $20,000. ld. 
91. AB. 4545, § 1, 2003-2004 Reg. Sess., 226 Annual Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2004). The non-
economic damages are limited to "compensation for the loss of the reasonably expected so-
ciety, companionship, love and affection of the companion animal." I d. 
92. A.B. 6340, 2003-2004 Reg. Sess., 226 Annual Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2004). 
93. ld. 
94. S.B. 225, 2003-2004 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2004) (proposing language similar to the Ten-
nessee act, with noneconomic damages capped at $4,000); H.R. 1260, 64th Gen. Assembly, 
7th Sess. (Colo. 2003) (proposing loss of companionship damages not to exceed $100,000 for 
hann resulting from cruelty to companion dogs and cats or from negligent veterinary prac-
tices); H.B. 109, 2004 Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2004) (proposing language similar to the Tennessee 
act with loss of companionship damages limited to $5,000), S.B. 2593,2003-2004 Leg. Sess. 
(R.I. 2004) (proposing language similar to the Tennessee act, with noneconomic damages 
capped at $1 0,000). 
95. David Haupe, Lost in the Tall Grass: GOP Wants Pet Oume1-s to Go Fetch in the Courts, 
THE CoURIER-JouRNAL (Louisville, Ky.), Apr. 23, 2003, at lOA. 
